"छ दिने युद्ध" का संशोधनहरू बिचको अन्तर

कुनै सम्पादन सारांश छैन
पङ्क्ति १२:
| territory = इजरायल द्वारा इजिप्टबाट गाजा पट्टि र सिनाइ प्रयाद्विप , जोर्डनबाट पश्चिमी तट र सिरिया बाट [[गोलन हाइट्स]] कब्जा
| combatant1 = '''{{Flag|इजरायल}}'''
| combatant2 = '''{{flagdeco|मिश्र|1958}} [[मिश्र]]'''<br />'''{{flag|सीरिया|1963}}'''<br />'''{{Flag|जोर्डन}}'''<br />{{flagicon image|Flag of Iraq (1963-1991).svg}} [[Iraq (1958–1968)|इराक]]<ref name="krauthammer">Krauthammer 2007.</ref><br/>
{{clist|title=Supported by:|{{flagicon image|Flag of Palestine.svg}} [[Palestine Liberation Organization|PLO]]{{cn|date=August 2018}}|{{Flag|Lebanon}}<ref name="Oren, P. 237">Oren, p. 237</ref>}}
| commander1 = {{Flagicon|Israel}} [[लेभी एस्कोल]]<br />{{Flagicon|Israel}} [[मोसे डायन्]]<br />{{Flagicon|Israel}} [[यित्जाक रबीन]]<br />{{Flagicon|Israel}} [[उजी नार्किस]]<br />{{Flagicon|Israel}} [[मोत्ता गुर|मोत्ता गुर]]<br />{{Flagicon|Israel}} [[Israel Tal]]<br />{{Flagicon|Israel}} [[मोर्देचाई होड]] <br />{{Flagicon|Israel}} [[येशायाहू गविश]]<br />{{Flagicon|Israel}} [[Ariel Sharon]]<br />{{Flagicon|Israel}} [[Ezer Weizman]]<br />{{Flagicon|Israel}} [[Shlomo Erell]]<br />{{Flagicon|Israel}} [[David Elazar]]
| commander2 = {{flagicon|Egypt|1958}} [[गमाल अब्देल नासेर]]<br />{{flagicon|Egypt|1958}} [[अब्देल हाकिम अमेर]]<br />{{flagicon|Egypt|1958}} [[अब्दुल मुनिम रिअद]]<br />{{flagicon|Jordan}} [[Hussein of Jordan|Hussein]]<br />{{flagicon |जोर्डन}} [[जियाद इबिन शकर]]<br />{{flagicon|Jordan}} [[असद घानमा]]<br />{{flagicon|Syria|1963}}<!-- Iraq and Syria had the same flag in 1967, see [[Flag of Syria]] (historical section) and [[:File:Syria-flag-changes.svg]] and http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/sy-his2.html, the current flag was introduced in 1980 --> [[Salah Jadid]]<br />{{flagicon|Syria|1963}}<!-- Iraq and Syria had the same flag in 1967, see [[Flag of Syria]] (historical section) and [[:File:Syria-flag-changes.svg]] and http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/sy-his2.html, the current flag was introduced in 1980 --> [[नरुद्दिन अल-अतास्सी]]<br />{{flagicon|Iraq|1963}} [[अब्दुल रहमान अरिफ]]
| strength1 = ५०,००० सेना<br />२१४,००० रिजर्भ <br />३०० जंगी जहाज<br />८००ट्यांक<ref name="Tucker 2004, p. 176">Tucker 2004, p.&nbsp;176.</ref><br />
'''Total troops''': २६४,००० <br />१,००,००० परिचालित
| strength2 = इजिप्ट: २४०,०००<br />सिरिया , जोर्डन, र इराक : ३०७,००० <br /> ९५७ जंगी जहाज <br />2,५०४ ट्यांक <ref name="Tucker 2004, p. 176" /><br />लेबनान : 2 जंगी जहाज<ref name="Griffin 2006, p. 336.">Griffin 2006, p. 336.</ref><br />
'''Total troops''': ५४७,००० <br /> २४०,००० परिचालित
| casualties1 = ७७६-९८३<ref name="Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs" /><ref name="Gawrych3" /> killed<br />४,५१७ घाइते<br />१५ बन्दी<ref name=Gawrych3>Gawrych 2000, p.&nbsp;3</ref>
<hr/>४०० ट्यांक नष्ट<ref>Zaloga, Steven (1981). ''Armour of the Middle East Wars 1948–78 (Vanguard)''. Osprey Publishing.</ref><br />४७ जहाज ध्वस्त
| casualties2 = इजिप्ट: १०,०००-१५,००० मृत्यु वा वेपत्ता <ref name="Gammasy p.79" /><ref name="Chaim Herzog 1982, p. 165" /><br />4,338 captured<ref name=>"Israel Ministry 2004" /<ref><br />जोर्डन : ६९६मृत्यु वा वेपत्ताing<ref name="tsdwb">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=L1qICwAAQBAJ&pg=PT125|title=The Six Day War 1967: Jordan and Syria|work=Simon Dunstan|publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing|date=20 February 2013|accessdate=6 January 2018}}</ref><ref name="Second World War page 253">''Warfare since the Second World War'', By Klaus Jürgen Gantzel, Torsten Schwinghammer, p. 253</ref><ref name="ReferenceC">''Wars in the Third World since 1945'', (NY 1991) [[Guy Arnold]]</ref><br />533 captured<ref name="Israel Ministry 2004" /><br /> Syria: 2,500 killed<ref name="Tucker, 2010">{{cite book |last=Tucker |first=Spencer C. |title=The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars. The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts |url=https://books.google.com.ar/books?id=U05OvsOPeKMC&pg=PA1198&dq=The+war+cost+Syria+2,500+killed&hl=en&sa=X&ei=yTPAVJb9F5bfsASgtoDgDg&ved=0CBMQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=The%20war%20cost%20Syria%202%2C500%20killed&f=false |publisher=ABC-CLIO |year=2010 |page=1198 |isbn=978-1-85109-947-4}}</ref><ref name="Woolf">{{cite book |last=Woolf |first=Alex |title=Arab–Israeli War Since 1948 |publisher=Heinemann-Raintree |year=2012 |page=27 |isbn=978-1-4329-6004-9}}</ref><ref name="Sachar, 2013">{{cite book |last=Sachar |first=Howard M. |title=A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time |url=https://books.google.com.ar/books?id=0X4BAAAAQBAJ&pg=PT1122&dq=they+had+lost+2,500+killed+and+5,000+wounded&hl=en&sa=X&ei=pzbAVKGHMsjbsATrnoHgCA&ved=0CBMQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=they%20had%20lost%202%2C500%20killed%20and%205%2C000%20wounded&f=false |publisher=Random House |year=2013 |isbn=978-0-8041-5049-1}}</ref><br />५९१ बन्दी<br />इराक : १० मृत्यु<br />३० घाइते<br />Lebanon: One aircraft lost<ref name="Griffin 2006, p. 336." />
<hr/>सयौ ट्यांक नष्ट <br />452+ aircraft destroyed
| casualties3 = २० इजरायली नागरिक मृत्यु<ref name="Oren, p. 185-187" /><br />३४ [[United States Navy|US Navy]], [[United States Marine Corps|Marine]], and [[National Security Agency|NSA]] personnel killed<ref>Gerhard, William D.; Millington, Henry W. (1981). "Attack on a SIGINT Collector, the USS Liberty" (PDF). NSA History Report, U.S. Cryptologic History series. National Security Agency. partially declassified 1999, 2003.</ref><ref>Both USA and Israel officially attributed the [[USS Liberty incident|USS ''Liberty'' incident]] as being due to mistaken identification.</ref><br />17 Soviet Marines killed (allegedly)<ref name=ginor/>
| campaignbox = {{Campaignbox Six-Day War}}
}}
पङ्क्ति ३०:
'''छ दिने युद्ध Six-Day War''' (हिब्रु : מלחמת ששת הימים{{lang|he|מלחמת ששת הימים}}, ''Milhemet Sheshet Ha Yamim''; [[अरबी भाषा|अरबी भाषा]]: النكسة{{lang|ar|النكسة}}, ''an-Naksah'', "The Setback" or حرب ۱۹٦۷{{lang|ar|حرب ۱۹٦۷}}, ''Ḥarb 1967'', "War of 1967"), '''जुन युद्ध''', '''१९६७  अरब-इजरायल युद्ध''' वा '''तेस्रो अरब-इजरायली युद्ध'''को रूपमा चिनिन्छ । इजरायली र  र ५ -१० जुन १९६७ मा [[इजरायल]] र [[मिश्र|इजिप्ट]] (संयुक्त अरब गणतन्त्र को रूपमा चिनिन्थ्यो)का छिमेकि देशहरु [[जोर्डन]] र [[सीरिया|सिरिया]] लडेका थिए ।
 
१९४८ अरब-इजरायली युद्ध पछि इस्राएल र यसको छिमेकीबीचको सम्बन्ध कहिल्यै पूर्णतया सामान्यतया थिएन। [[स्वेज संकट|सन् १९५६  मा इजरायलले मिश्रको सिनाइ प्रान्तमा  आक्रमण गरे]], यसको उद्देश्यले १९५०  देखि इजरायली जहाजमा मिस्रले लगाएको रोक हटाउनु थियो थियो । इजरायल पछि लाग्न बाध्य भए, तर टेयरको स्ट्रिट्स खुला रहनेछ भन्ने ग्यारेन्टी जित्यो। जबकि संयुक्त राष्ट्र सशस्त्र बल सीमामा  तैनाथ भएको थियो, त्यहाँ कुनै असैनिकीकरण सम्झौता भएको थिएन ।<ref name="Rikhye2013">{{cite book|author=Major General Indar Jit Rikhye|title=The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force Leading....|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=teHWAQAAQBAJ&pg=PR8|date=28 October 2013|publisher=Taylor & Francis|isbn=978-1-136-27985-0|pages=8–}}</ref>
 
जून १९६७ सम्मको अवधिमा, तनावहरू खतरनाक रूपमा बढ्यो। इजरायलीले १९५६ को पछाडि आफ्नो पद दोहोर्याए कि टायरको स्ट्रिटको बन्दोडिङको यो शिपिंगमा क्यासस बेली हुनेछ। मे मईमा मिस्रका राष्ट्रपति [[गमाल अब्देल नासेर|गमाल अब्दुल नासेर]]ले घोषणा गरे कि स्ट्राट्जमा इजरायली जहाजहरू बन्द हुनेछ र त्यसपछि इजरायलसँग यसको सीमाको साथमा मिस्र सेना परिचालन गरे । 5 जुनमा,  इजरायलीले इजिप्ट एयरफिल्डको विरुद्ध यो दावी गरेको थियो कि यो निस्क्रिय हवाई आक्रमणको श्रृंखला थियो । दावी र घटनाहरूको यो श्रृंखलासँग सम्बन्धित दावीहरू विवाद सम्बन्धित विषयमा एक विवाद हो।
पङ्क्ति ४१:
 
== Footnotes ==
{{reflist|25em|refs=<ref name="Szabo2011p147">{{cite book|author=Kinga Tibori Szabó|title=Anticipatory Action in Self-Defence: Essence and Limits under International Law|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0FvVW69x-esC&pg=PA147|date=22 August 2011|publisher=Springer Science & Business Media|isbn=978-90-6704-796-8|pages=147, 148|quote="(p. 147) The sequence of events that led to the Israeli pre-emptive strike did indeed create a situation where an armed attack seemed unavoidable. (p. 148 ) Many commentators treat it (the six day war) as the locus classicus of anticipatory action in self defence"}}</ref>
 
<ref name="Quigley2012p135">{{cite book|author=John Quigley|title=The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense: Questioning the Legal Basis for Preventive War|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OLogAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA135|date=17 December 2012|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-139-62049-9|pages=135–|quote="Terence Taylor…wrote in 2004…that "many scholars" considered Israel to have "conducted the (1967) action in anticipatory of self-defense"}}</ref>
 
<ref name="Gluska2007p152">{{cite book|author=Ami Gluska|title=The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, Armed Forces and Defence Policy 1963–67|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1Z3-LzdcZacC&pg=PA152&lpg=PA152&dq=nasser+gafgafa+pilots+ahalan+sahalan&source=bl&ots=c5rE5fwrjs&sig=SNQVIBscDmCjd77hWsTc9GvNrmU&hl=en&sa=X&ei=fvs9Vc_VEIL1apypgKgB&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=nasser%20gafgafa%20pilots%20ahalan%20sahalan&f=false|date=12 February 2007|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-134-16377-9|pages=152|quote="On the evening of 22 May, President Gamal Abdul Nasser, accompanied by ... Egyptian air force base at Bir Gafgafa in Sinai and addressed the pilots and officers. ... 'The Jews are threatening war – we say to them ahlan wa-sahlan (welcome)!"}}</ref>
 
<ref name="Quandt2001p43">{{cite book|author=William B. Quandt|title=Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-rmCPnSghbcC&pg=PA36|year=2001|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-22374-5|page=42|quote="once hostilities were under way, the United states imposed an embargo on new arms agreements to all countries of the Middle East, including Israel. The embargo remained in force through the end of the year, despite urgent Israeli requests to lift it."}}</ref>
 
<ref name="Mutawi2002p93">{{cite book|author=Samir A. Mutawi|title=Jordan in the 1967 War|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g9bBJusRJIMC|date=18 July 2002|publisher=Cambridge University Press| isbn=978-0-521-52858-0|page=93| quote="Although Eshkol denounced the Egyptians, his response to this development was a model of moderation. His speech on 21 May demanded that Nasser withdraw his forces from Sinai but made no mention of the removal of UNEF from the Straits nor of what Israel would do if they were closed to Israeli shipping. The next day Nasser announced to an astonished world that henceforth the Straits were, indeed, closed to all Israeli ships"}}</ref>
 
<!--ref name="Mangold2013p135">{{cite book|author=Peter Mangold|title=Superpower Intervention in the Middle East|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Ld9SAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA135|date=14 October 2013|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-135-04683-5|pages=135–}}</ref-->
पङ्क्ति ५९:
<!--ref name=Shlaim2012p63>{{cite book |last=Shlaim |first=Avi |title=The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8YhNPNeBh8IC&pg=PA106 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2012 |page=63 |isbn=978-1-107-00236-4 |quote="he claimed in a public speech to have been aware of all the implications: "Taking over Sharm El Sheikh meant confrontation with Israel. It also means that we ready to enter a general war with Israel. It was not a separate operation"..}}</ref-->
 
<ref name="PodehWinckler2004p105">{{cite book|author1=Elie Podeh|author2=Onn Winckler|title=Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1Z-po72YcH4C|date=1 December 2004|publisher=University Press of Florida|isbn=978-0-8130-3137-8|pages=105, 106|quote=the prominent historian and commentator Abd al-Azim Ramadan, In a series of articles published in AlWafd, subsequently compiled in a hook published in 2000, Ramadan criticized the Nasser cult, .... The events leading up to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, as other events during Nasser's rule, Ramadan wrote, showed Nasser to be far from a rational, responsible leader. ... His decision to nationalize the Suez Canal was his alone, made without political or military consultation. ... The source of all this evil. Ramadan noted, was Nasser's inclination to solitary decision making... the revolutionary regime led by the same individual—Nasser—repeated its mistakes when it decided to expel the international peacekeeping force from the Sinai Peninsula and close the Straits of Tiran in 1967. Both decisions led to a state of war with Israel, despite the lack of military preparedness}}</ref>
 
<ref name="PodehWinckler2004p110">{{cite book|author1=Elie Podeh|author2=Onn Winckler|title=Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1Z-po72YcH4C|date=1 December 2004|publisher=University Press of Florida|isbn=978-0-8130-3137-8|pages=110, 111|quote=The most outstanding exponent of the Nasserist narrative was Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, who also embodied the revolutionary heritage personally as Nasser's closest aid and the editor in chief of the state-sponsored dailies Al-Akhbar and Al-Ahram.... Haykal acknowledged that Nasser had erred in various fields, noting that he had admitted, for example, his responsibility for the military defeat in the June 1967 War}}</ref>
 
<ref name=shemesh2007p118>{{cite book|last=Shemesh|first=Moshe|title=Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and the Six Day War: The Crystallization of Arab Strategy and Nasir's Descent to War, 1957–1967|year=2007|publisher=Sussex Academic Press|isbn=1-84519-188-9|page=118|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4u-ZheMnqf8C&pg=PA118|quote=The Jordanian leadership's appraisal of the repercussions of the Samu' raid was a major factor in King Husayn's decision to join Nasir's war chariot by signing a joint defense pact with Egypt on May 30, 1967. This was the determining factor for Jordan's participation in the war that would soon break out.... Convinced after the Samu' raid that Israel's strategic goal was the West Bank, Husayn allied himself to Nasir out of a genuine fear that, in a comprehensive war, Israel would invade the West Bank whether or not Jordan was an active participant.}}</ref>
 
<ref name="Shlaim2000p243">{{cite book|author=Shlaim|title=The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World|year= 2000| pages=243–244 |quote="In May–June 1967 [[Levi Eshkol|Eshkol]]'s government did everything in its power to confine the confrontation to the Egyptian front. [[Levi Eshkol|Eshkol]] and his colleagues took into account the possibility of some fighting on the Syrian front. But they wanted to avoid having a clash with Jordan and the inevitable complications of having to deal with the predominantly Palestinian population of the West Bank. The fighting on the eastern front was initiated by Jordan, not by Israel. King Hussein got carried along by a powerful current of Arab nationalism. On 30 May he flew to Cairo and signed a defense pact with Nasser. On 5 June, Jordan started shelling the Israeli side in Jerusalem. This could have been interpreted either as a salvo to uphold Jordanian honour or as a declaration of war. [[Levi Eshkol|Eshkol]] decided to give King Hussein the benefit of the doubt. Through General [[Odd Bull]], the Norwegian commander of UNTSO, he sent the following message the morning of 5 June: "We shall not initiate any action whatsoever against Jordan. However, should Jordan open hostilities, we shall react with all our might, and the king will have to bear the full responsibility of the consequences." King Hussein told General Bull that it was too late; the die was cast."}}</ref>
 
<!--ref name=Shlaim2012p106>{{cite book |last=Shlaim |first=Avi |title=The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8YhNPNeBh8IC&pg=PA106 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2012 |page=106 |isbn=978-1-107-00236-4 |quote=Nasser responded by taking three successive steps that made war virtually inevitable: he deployed his troops in Sinai near Israel's border on 14 May; expelled the UNEF from the Gaza Strip and Sinai on 19 May; and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping on 22 May.}}</ref-->
पङ्क्ति ७५:
<!--ref name="TimeSamu1">[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,843082,00.html#ixzz0c1lwqMPn Middle East: Incident at Samu], ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'', 25 November 1966</ref-->
 
<ref name=Tessler1994p378>{{cite book|last=Tessler|first=Mark|title=A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict|year=1994|publisher=John Wiley & Sons|isbn=0-253-20873-4|page=378|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3kbU4BIAcrQC&pg=PA378|quote=Towards the War of June 1967: Growing tensions in the region were clearly visible long before Israel's November attack on Samu and two other West Bank towns. An escalating spiral of raid and retaliation had already been set in motion...}}</ref>
 
<!--ref name=MZ242>{{cite book|last=Maoz|first=Zeev|title=Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security and Foreign Policy |year=2009|publisher=The University of Michigan Press|isbn=0-472-03341-7|page=242|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hHQe4qn-EmUC&pg=PA242#v=onepage&q&f=false}}</ref-->
पङ्क्ति ८१:
<!--ref name=MZ84>{{cite book|last=Maoz|first=Zeev|title=Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security and Foreign Policy |year=2009|publisher=The University of Michigan Press|isbn=0-472-03341-7|page=84|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hHQe4qn-EmUC&pg=PA84&d#v=onepage&q&f=false|quote=The domestic struggle in Syria grew into a competition in radical rhetoric vis-a-vis Israel. ... the Ba'ath regime in Syria provided both Logistical and practical support to the PLO. Most infiltrations to Israel after 1965 originated from the Syrian border. Syria also increased its own military actions against Israel by shelling Israeli settlements in the border area. These actions entailed significant costs, as Israeli artillery and air force repeatedly pounded Syrian positions on the Golan Height. Yet, as long as Israel's responses were limited and did not involve any raids on Syrian positions, this was an acceptable price for the struggling regime in Damascus.<P>By the fall of 1966 and spring of 1967, things seemed to be getting out of hand. Israeli-initiated encroachments into the demilitarized zones (DMZ) along the Syrian border became more frequent and intense. Israeli leaders made repeated statements to the effect that the Syrian regime was directly responsible for the border clashes and that Israel may act directly against the Syrian regime}}</ref-->
 
<!-- <ref name="CIAestimate1967">{{cite web|author1=Sherman Kent for the Central Intelligence Agency's Board of National Estimates|title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 79 79. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency's Board of National Estimates to Director of Central Intelligence Helms|url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d79|location=Washington|date=26 May 1967|quote=The most likely course seems to be for Nasser to hold to his present winnings as long as he can, and in as full measure as he can. As of the moment he has vastly enhanced his own prestige in Egypt and throughout the Arab world, diminished the standing of Israel and, at least for the moment, administered a serious setback to the US. Moreover, by simply standing where he is he places the Israelis in an extremely difficult position. He keeps the crisis at high pitch, and as long as this continues the Israelis must remain mobilized. This they cannot do for long without adverse effects upon their economy. 5. The Israelis face dismaying choices. Surprised and shaken by Nasser's action, they failed to take the instant military counteraction which might have been most effective. If they attack now they will face far more formidable opposition than in the rapid campaign of 1956. We believe that they would still be able to drive the Egyptians away from the entrance to the Strait of Tiran, but it would certainly cost them heavy losses of men and materiel. We are not sure that they have sufficient stockpiles of ammunition and equipment for a war lasting more than three or four weeks, and it is possible that they would not embark upon a major campaign without prior assurances from the US of adequate resupply.}}</ref> -->
 
<ref name=Colonomos2013p25>{{cite book |last=Colonomos |first=Ariel |title=The Gamble of War: Is it Possible to Justify Preventive War? |url=https://books.google.com.ar/books?id=_YSWUQvAIEUC&pg=PA25&dq=Egypt+carried+out+mass+mobilization+of+its+troops+on+the+Israeli+border+and+during+the+night+of+May+22%E2%80%9323,+Nasser+decided+to+close+the+Straits+of+Tiran,+which+control+access+to+the+Red+Sea,+to+Israeli+shipping&hl=es-419&sa=X&ei=4SbAVNKoOqbIsASJvoL4Dg&ved=0CBMQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Egypt%20carried%20out%20mass%20mobilization%20of%20its%20troops%20on%20the%20Israeli%20border%20and%20during%20the%20night%20of%20May%2022%E2%80%9323%2C%20Nasser%20decided%20to%20close%20the%20Straits%20of%20Tiran%2C%20which%20control%20access%20to%20the%20Red%20Sea%2C%20to%20Israeli%20shipping&f=false |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |year=2013 |page=25 |isbn=978-1-137-01894-6}}</ref>
 
<ref name=Gat2003p202>{{cite book |last=Gat |first=Moshe |title=Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East, 1964–1967: The Coming of the Six-Day War |url=https://books.google.com.ar/books?id=ntLdA8QIgXIC&pg=PA202&dq=On+the+night+of+May+22-23,+Nasser+declared+the+Gulf+of+Aqaba+closed+to+Israeli+shipping&hl=es-419&sa=X&ei=myXAVKKQM8jIsASWi4IY&ved=0CBMQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=On%20the%20night%20of%20May%2022-23%2C%20Nasser%20declared%20the%20Gulf%20of%20Aqaba%20closed%20to%20Israeli%20shipping&f=false |publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group |year=2003 |page=202 |isbn=0-275-97514-2}}</ref>
<ref name="MeirStraitsSpeech">"Interference, by armed force, with ships of Israeli flag exercising free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits of Tiran will be regarded by Israel as an attack entitling it to exercise its inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter and to take all such measures as are necessary to ensure the free and innocent passage of its ships in the Gulf and in the Straits." {{cite web |url=http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/26+Statement+to+the+General+Assembly+by+Foreign+Mi.htm |title=Statement to the General Assembly by Foreign Minister Meir, 1 March 1957 |publisher=Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs – The State of Israel}}</ref>}}
 
== सन्दर्भ ==
<ref name="MeirStraitsSpeech">"Interference, by armed force, with ships of Israeli flag exercising free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits of Tiran will be regarded by Israel as an attack entitling it to exercise its inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter and to take all such measures as are necessary to ensure the free and innocent passage of its ships in the Gulf and in the Straits." {{cite web |url=http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/26+Statement+to+the+General+Assembly+by+Foreign+Mi.htm |title=Statement to the General Assembly by Foreign Minister Meir, 1 March 1957 |publisher=Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs – The State of Israel}}</ref>}}
{{reflist}}
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